Questions tagged [semantics]
Semantics, in philosophy, often refers to "relation between signs and the things to which they refer and is seen, often, within the school of rhetoric.
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Would the word "dog" mean anything if, at some time, it was not being read or thought of?
I am someone who believes that meaning happens only in consciousness. In my view, words would have no meaning in a philosophical zombie world. But my view raises an interesting dilemma. Suppose, at ...
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Does Tarskis conception require a difference between truth predicate and truth value in formal logic
So, I asked a similar question in maths, but from the answers I got, I figured it maybe is too philosophically loaded (I hope this is ok).
But still my main interest lies in the actual application of ...
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On Buridan's Formula
In beginning I must confess that I am a Formalist when it comes to mathematics and philosophy. Formalism is defined as the following per Wikipedia: Formalism is the view that holds that statements of ...
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How could prototype theory give rise to logical semantics? [closed]
My first claim is an observation that there are some subsystems in the mind where humans show perfect competency with typed elements, and there are some subsystems in the mind where humans struggle ...
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Is "equal to" a good substitute for "meaning of"?
Perhaps this is a semantics question, but what I would like is to be able to substitute the question "What is the meaning of life?" to "What is life equal to?" and I want to know ...
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How much recursion is needed in the set in order to make a reliable conclusion? [closed]
In formal systems, recursive definitions must be fully specified to ensure the reliability of conclusions.
However, in natural human thinking, we often rely on context-dependent partial recursion to ...
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Truth Tables vs Metalanguage
I've seen in the book "Logic for everyone" by Jason Decker that he writes the Propositions on the header of the tables as meta-Propositions.
E.g. for the formula
A→C
𝒜
𝒞
𝒜→𝒞
T
T
T
T
F
F
...
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Do variables belong to metalanguage
I'm learning the nuance between using and mentioning. Maybe what I'm going to write is a result of misunderstanding.
The object language (OL) contains names of objects from a domain, a assumed real ...
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Can contradiction be treated as a structural feature of meaning, rather than a failure of logic? [closed]
In traditional logical and semantic systems, contradiction is often seen as something to be eliminated — a signal that the reasoning process has gone wrong.
But what if contradiction is a structural ...
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Identifying a name with the designated thing (in the context of Being)
My question is about the following perplexing passage of Plato's “Sophist,” in which young Theaetetus and the Stranger of Elea, a disciple of Eleatic philosophy, debate about certain problems of the ...
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Can Tarski's statement about "true statement" be improved?
A sentence is true if and only if what the sentence describes is the case.
My main doubt started when I realised that we are comparing sentence, a collection of words, to reality, the case. Something ...
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What is the difference between Ordinary Meaning, Profound Meaning, and True Meaning? [closed]
While discussing the question Is Machine our new God?!, I found myself explaining a distinction I hadn't consciously articulated before: the difference between Ordinary Meaning, Profound Meaning, and ...
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A question about structure of descriptions of objects ,can they be broken down into non divisible pieces?
Think of a description of an object, having qualities Q(a),Q(b).
Q(a) can also have a description of it's own which one might try to describe to another person using a common language, and while ...
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Is the phrase “infinitely divisible” describing just one property or two properties by condensation? [closed]
Is the phrase “infinitely divisible” describing just one property or two properties by condensation? I ask because the phrase “infinitely divisible” can be interpreted as the conjunction of two ...
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What is a logical connective?
Peter Smith in chapter 8 of "An Introduction to Formal Logic" introduces three sentential/logical connectives: 'And', 'Or' and 'Not'. He gives a brief exposition on such natural language ...
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How does descriptive (folk) metaethics tell us about moral properties and facts?
Metaethics typically investigates two broad domains:
(a) The semantics of moral discourse:
(i) Are moral utterances truth-apt?
(ii) Do they have truth-makers?
(b) The metaphysics of morality:
(i) Do ...
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Did Cantor mean something different by his concept of transfinite numbers, from what is meant by (most) set theorists afterwards/down to this day?
For that they have shorn absolute infinity of its mystical significance, have set theorists since Cantor ended up meaning something sufficiently different by the phrase "absolute infinity" ...
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If there are set-theoretic "possible worlds," are there set-theoretic "possible situations"?
The SEP entry on situations in natural-language semantics reads:
Situation semantics was developed as an alternative to possible worlds semantics. In situation semantics, linguistic expressions are ...
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How would you adapt modern day model-theoretic formal semantics, to allow for usual/unusual meanings? [closed]
In language , we can employ usual meanings of language-tokens and unusual meaning of language-tokens
without the notion of "usual meaning" of language-tokens, communication would be a ...
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Alternatives to alethic/truth-conditional/theoretic semantics for natural languages (especially intensional ones)
Good evening, everyone.
Since Frege the meaning of sentences has been conditioned to its truth-condition (be it as a truth-value being the referent of a sentence or truth being a property of a true ...
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What does Talia Mae Bettcher mean by "semantic contextualism"?
In the paper Trans Feminism: Recent Philosophical Developments, Bettcher discusses the idea that it is hard to define the word "woman" and be inclusive of everyone that should be included (...
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meaning of semantic indexed truth-value assignments
The issue of the following reasoning is to learn completeness of propositional calculus.
I am learning the book "An introduction to Logic and its philosophy", Peter Schotch 2006. The aim of ...
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"Is" color extension, and vice versa?
In his mereology, Husserl defines moments as inseparable parts and cites examples such as the relationship between intensity and quality or the relationship between color and extension: I never see a ...
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Hume's distinction between two types of reasoning
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence.
Why does ...
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Is The Knowledge of Zero Qualitatively Different From The Knowledge of Infinity?
I look at Zero and Infinity, Quantitatively, one is Nothing vs other Everything.
For some reason I find Zero more intuitive than Infinity. Just wanted to know if there is some difference between ...
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syntactic negation and falsehood
Delong (A profile of Mathematical Logic §16 p. 170 in the Kindle edition) wrote that we can denying the antecedent by having an obviously false consequence follow from it.
A similar device is ...
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Connection between inference rule and Tautology
In the book A Profile of Mathematical Logic from Howard DeLong in § 16, Primary logic, the Propositional calculus, I noticed two teachings quoted below:
To each valid argument there corresponds a ...
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Framework for explaining the notion "implementing according to a specification"?
Explaining "Implementing a specification"
I'm currently looking into the notion of "implementing according to a specification" in engineering, and in particular in software ...
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Is the Context Principle widely accepted, and why might it be plausible?
The Context Principle says to "never ... ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition", which I take to mean that we should not look to words in ...
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What's the deal with definitional disputes relying so much on the particulars of language?
Full disclosure: I’m a linguistics student and not a philosophy one, my only formal experience in philosophy is one epistemology and one applied ethics class
When I was in my epistemology class, one ...
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An intensional system of meaning for predicates? (And related thoughts)
In general, I am interested in a paradigm something like this:
When we have premises, there are rules that can allow us to derive consequences of those premises.
Sometimes, going in the reverse ...
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What is the relationship between causation and reference?
When an observer looks at a dog, and uses that information to comment on the color of the dog's coat, there is a chain of causation leading directly from the dog to the observer's statement about the ...
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Is there a real difference between pragmatics and semantics in practice?
I am not sure where to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics. It appears that philosophers often attempt to solve a problem with regards to the use of language and suggest a theory that they ...
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Extensional context:"S believes in x"
I know that there is some research in philosophy on the difference between (A) "S believes that p" and (B) "S believes in x" (e.g. H. H. Price and Gendler Szabó). But I cannot find ...
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Can we understand the meaning of moral statements by what in the mind causes them to be made?
When a person says "this is morally good" or "this is morally bad," something caused them to make this statement. Typical causes may include:
They were told by their parents that ...
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Is Kripke truth semantics related to LUB semantics of the Lambda Calculus?
Lambda Calculus semantics are defined over a formal structure of values that are partially ordered with respect a sort of "more defined" relation. The least element is the completely ...
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Do images have propositional content?
It's uncontroversial that most declarative sentences have propositional content, and can therefore be true or false. However they are just one way of conveying information. If 'There exists a red wall'...
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What does it mean to have a truth value of a 'nothing' type instance?
I'm from a programming background, so please forgive me for asking programming-related logic questions. My question is this: Many things have a truth value, including true and false themselves. ...
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Are there any one-word idioms? [closed]
Definition 1. An idiom is a group of words established by usage as having a meaning not deducible from those of the individual words.
Definition 2. An idiom is a phrase or expression that has a ...
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Why isn't the Liar's Paradox just accepted to be complete nonsense?
I can understand that some self-referential sentences can be sensible and have truth/false values (e.g. "This sentence is written in English." is true, "This sentence has 1,000 words.&...
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How can we formalize the claim that these two languages are equally expressive?
Let T be a stripped-down version of propositional logic, whose only connectives are ¬ and ➝, and suppose T can prove all the usual theorems that can be formed from only these two connectives. Let T’ ...
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Is Anselm's argument supposed to be understood in terms of hyperintensionality?
Hyperintensionality is something to do with e.g. the difference between, "I believe that Dean is Dean," vs., "I believe that Dean is Ackles." Generally, an operation X on A and B ...
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Is the meaning of a sign the effect it has on your mind?
Is the meaning of something identifiable or reducible to the motion or effect it causes on the mind that interprets it?
For example, the meaning of a photograph could be said to be the nostalgic ...
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Why is "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" considered meaningless?
I initially posted this in Linguistics, but wanted to get philosophers' opinions on this as well. (And someone over there is complaining that it's a philosophical rather than a linguistic question... ...
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If a proposition is necessarily true, does it follow that it's a tautology?
If □P, does it follow that P is a tautology?
I know in K modal logic, the law of NEC states
⊢ P; therefore □P.
The corresponding conditional of the previous argument is
If ⊢ P then □P.
Now ⊢P iff P is ...
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On the difference between a meta-variable and a propositional atom
In all of the established propositional logics that I’m aware of, a propositional atom is treated as a meta-variable. In certain first-order proof systems, this does not hold for those same logics ...
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What are some logically equivalent formulations of “uniqueness”?
A monoid is a mathematical structure with an associative law of composition and an identity element. It can be proven that if an element of a monoid has an inverse, then the inverse is unique:
Assume ...
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Wittgenstein on sense
What's sense according to Wittgenstein?
I think I might have missed the definition in TLP, but I can't find it anywhere.
From the context it's obvious that Wittgenstein's sense isn't that of Frege. ...
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Wittgenstein and the primary elements
What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to the elements? One might say: if everything that we call “being” and “non-being” consists in the obtaining and non-...
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Wittgenstein and tautology
What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor
non-being to the elements? One might say: if everything that we call
“being” and “non-being” consists in the obtaining and non-...