Questions tagged [truth-conditional-semantics]
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26 questions
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Alternatives to alethic/truth-conditional/theoretic semantics for natural languages (especially intensional ones)
Good evening, everyone.
Since Frege the meaning of sentences has been conditioned to its truth-condition (be it as a truth-value being the referent of a sentence or truth being a property of a true ...
8
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1
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Which systems of formal logic do not admit vacuous truth for universal statements?
As I understand it there are systems of formal logic that do not admit vacuous truth for universal statements, what known systems of formal logic satisfy this constraint?
An example Kripke as I ...
6
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2
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The Duhem-Quine thesis was extended by Quine. Can it be extended even further?
On the issue of Underdetermination, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy mentions that
“Quine suggested that such challenges applied not only to the confirmation of all types of scientific theories,...
3
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2
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Possible variants of T-schema
Let me use this notation:
"xxx"(OL) means that "xxx" is a proposition in the Object Language;
"xxx"(ML) means that "xxx" is a proposition in the Meta-Language.
...
6
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9
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Can a function have a set as its value? [closed]
In relation to his possible worlds analysis of natural language conditionals (e.g. 1975 Indicative Conditionals) Robert Stalnaker posited a function which takes an antecedent proposition and a ...
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5
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By what generic method do we correctly determine that an analytical expression of language is true?
The answer to this is a philosophy of logic question would seem to unify the notion of analytic truth across all formal and natural languages. This subject of this question seems to refer to the ...
1
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1
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Do Gödel's incompleteness theorems and Tarski's theorem of indefinability of truth show we can never discover and prove every truth?
I thought I had a grasp on this. Do Gödel's apply to just math; logic, too; or more, and what does its applicability entail? If it applies to math, does it apply to physics? Similarly with Tarski: can ...
0
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0
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How would demi-conditionals work?
Let 𝒜 = an actuality operator and √→ be demi-if. Which, if any, of the following conversions would go through?
𝒜A √→ 𝒜B = √𝒜A → √𝒜B
𝒜A √→ 𝒜B = √𝒜A → 𝒜B
𝒜A √→ 𝒜B = 𝒜A → √𝒜B
𝒜A √→ 𝒜B = √�...
0
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1
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128
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I think I finally understand alethic nihilism
So the definition of truth is that p is true if and only if p.
However, since the Liar Paradox states that p is true if and only if p is false, this is a contradiction.
So the words truth and falsity ...
3
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5
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How Does Alethic Nihlism Address The "Changing Of Subject" Objection?
I recently read this article in my pursuit to understand what alethic nihlism is trying to say:
https://philarchive.org/archive/ASASIT
One of the objections to alethic nihlism is that alethic nihlism ...
0
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1
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Trivialism vs Alethic Nihlism
What are the similiarities and differences between the two theories (as well as arguments for and counterarguments against).
From what I know, trivialism states that everything is true (and I believe ...
5
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1
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641
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What's so special about Tarski's T-Schema?
It seems fairly obvious. Even a five year old could probably come up with it. Its obvious that if something is the case, it is true (literally synonyms).
So, am I missing something? Is there a gulf ...
3
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4
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227
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How can alethic nihilism be justified?
I read the article “On the Advantages of Believing that Nothing is True”. I just don't understand how someone can believe something is the case, but is not true. It's like saying you believe unmarried ...
0
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√◊ (or generally √M, for whatever modal operator(s) M)
I tried Googling "demi-possibility demi-negation" and got nothing (just "demi-possibility" gave results mostly related to demisexuality). And my analysis of demi-negation didn't ...
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6
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How is Truth Different From Reality?
Is the whole question like "what is truth" just about finding definitions to things we know but can't put into words to explain (things that are currently ineffable). For example, everyone ...
4
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3
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529
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What is Alethic Nihilism?
I recently came across this reddit post:
https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/15chen5/comment/jtwnkkw/
I think it has something to do with denying the truth predicate without denying the ...
5
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1
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105
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Questions Regarding Tarski's Semantical Formalization of the Colloquial Usage of Truth
My question is in regard to a problem (albeit a simple one) that I ran into reading Tarski's paper "Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages".
On page 159 Tarski states:
(5) for all p, ‘p' ...
3
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1
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174
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What are the arguments of philosophers against the reasoning which justifies the horseshoe from truth-functionality?
There is a reasoning in mathematical logic which is meant to prove that the horseshoe is the only logical operation which fits our notion of conditional.
The reasoning starts from the idea that the ...
5
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2
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512
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Book request: A nosology of untruths
I recall reading several philosophical articles which deal with various types of untruths: lies, misrepresentations, contradictions, omissions, confabulations, delusions, hallucinations, apparitions, ...
4
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2
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351
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The limits on formal semantics: compositionality, context and truth values
I am a little bit surprised by the principle of composionality in semantics (I'm very new to all of this), which states that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its ...
2
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1
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Is this a legitimate way to reframe structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics?
As an umbrella term, "structuralism" has to cover realist and nonrealist versions, while also carrying through the theme of its name nontrivially (for there is a trivial way to make ...
2
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0
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When does a conditional statement hold true according to Dialetheists?
I understand that for the consequent to really follow from the antecedent, it (the consequent) must be both relevant and necessary given the antecedent.
So my question is: which types of conditional ...
0
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1
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Semantic consequence and Sound Argument
Is that correct to say that semantic consequence is equivalent to the concept of sound argument in classical propositional logic?
If it is the case, arguments or theories with contradictory premises ...
2
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1
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435
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Lewis's truth condition for counterfactuals
According to SEP, Lewis's theory of counterfactual conditionals defines truth for counterfactuals as follows:
[...] the truth condition for the counterfactual “If A were (or had been)
the case, C ...
1
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2
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Truth value for objects that are not included in definitions
Consider the statement "This triangle has radius 3" and the statement "This cat is a chihuahua". Both radius and chihuahua are terms defined for different kind of objects than the objects we are ...
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11
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What is the difference between Law of Excluded Middle and Principle of Bivalence?
Law of Excluded Middle:
In logic, the law of excluded middle (or the principle of excluded
middle) is the third of the so-called three classic laws of thought.
It states that for any proposition, ...