The following question is intentionally informal because I don't understand things well enough to make them entirely formal. The topic is Universal Composability.
An important notion in the definition of security is that of being indistinguishable to an environment. To be more precise, you have two 'open' systems, and the notion of equality we are interested in is that of 'contextual' equality. That is, no environment should be able to distinguish between these two open systems.
(As a side note, these 'open systems' are often not just the protocol, but also include an attack / adversary, which models possible adversarial influence / leakage)
When you want to model concurrent systems, I think that the environment also plays the role of the scheduler, and chooses the next 'machine' in the system to be activated, etc.
On a very high level, it seems to me that the environment can count the number / kinds of scheduling decisions and distinguish two systems that should be 'intuitively' equal.
A vague / informal example is something like comparing a sequential ideal functionality with a concurrent distributed implementation. It seems to me that it might be possible that the environment might have to make more 'scheduling decisions' in the second case, and thus, be able to 'count' these and distinguish the two systems.
Is this a real issue in UC? Or maybe I am missing something?